Bibliografía anotada para el Cursillo

“This sensible, warm motion”:* Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of Sentient/Sensitive Motility

“Esta sensibilidad, este calor, este movimiento”.* La fenomenología de la movilidad sensitiva/sentiente de Edmund Husserl

*William Shakespeare

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Selected Resources

Table of Contents

Opening remarks

§1. Edmund Husserl
   Primary sources
   The main works I drew on for the cursillo
   Other important works in the background of the cursillo
   Selected works toward understanding Husserl's phenomenology of the body
   The philosopher as a person and the story of his Nachlass
   Selected secondary sources

§2. Questions of method
   A basic distinction
   The notion of “intentional analysis”
   Contributions from Richard Zaner
   The notion of “appropriate sensibility”
   From the “things themselves” to the “phenomena themselves”
   Questions of textual interpretation
   Appropriating phenomenological methods for oneself

§3. Time

§4. Sensory fields

§5. Kinaesthetic consciousness

§6. Affectivity

§7. Limit cases and liminal experiences
   Whose body?
   Difficult experiences
   The possibility of a bodily practice of peace

§8. Body/movement awareness practices as allies in developing an “appropriate sensibility” for the experiential evidence proper to a phenomenology of the body and of affectivity

§9. Miscellaneous works related to our discussions and questions
§10. Further background on a Husserlian phenomenology of the body

Closing remarks

Opening remarks

As promised, here is a bibliography for the cursillo, including not only the works I had already chosen for this list of resources before arriving in Morelia, but also the works I referred to in responding to your questions and interests. Many of my own essays are included below, not only because I drew upon these works in my presentations for the cursillo, but because they are a concentrated source of further specific references (to Husserl and to others) relevant to our themes. Please note that this selected bibliography is addressed to two audiences: first of all, and above all, it is meant for the participants in this particular cursillo, whose interdisciplinary backgrounds and interests contributed to our work together—but in addition, it is also for any student of Husserl who wishes to see one way in which the themes in question (affectivity, the lived body, etc.) can be approached in a Husserlian manner. Of course these lists are incomplete; more works could be cited in each category (and the categories themselves overlap). But the works listed here can serve as resources to confirm points we have already touched upon and to lead toward further insights.

§1. Edmund Husserl (8 April 1859 – 27 April 1938)

Primary sources

[NB: During the cursillo I also referred to or quoted from other Husserliana volumes as well, but the primary sources listed in the three subsections below are the core sources informing my approach to our themes. Please note that although there are various ways to refer to Husserl’s works in abbreviated form (for instance, Hua = the Husserliana series, Hua Mat = the Husserliana Materialien series, etc., followed by the roman numeral for the volume in question, then the page number), I often use a simpler convention whereby the first number refers to the Husserliana volume number, then the page number follows after a slash (e.g., 14/447), using the same convention with the abbreviation HM for the Husserliana Materialien series (e.g., HM8/327). Why? Many calls for conference papers specify word limits, and some journals specify characters-with-spaces limits: contrast, e.g., Hua XXXVIII, p. 477 with 38/477(!)]

The main works I drew on for the cursillo


[On the phenomenological reduction. Texts from the Nachlass (1926–1935). These texts have very much influenced my understanding of Husserl’s transcendentalphenomenological methods.]

Late texts on time-constitution (1929–1934). The C manuscripts. Also includes material on instincts, affection, kinaestheses. Husserl organized the C manuscripts into 17 groups; I drew primarily upon groups C 15 and C 16 for the cursillo.


[The lifeworld. Explications of the pregiven world and its constitution. Texts from the Nachlass (1916–1937). Includes a great variety of themes—primal affection, horizontality, situatedness, practical action, tradition, normality, and much more.]

Other important works in the background of the cursillo


[Husserl himself considered this his most mature work; excellent for what "transcendental" phenomenology means for him.]


[Detailed analyses of experiential structures from pre-predicative experience to predicative judgment. §8 is a well-known presentation of the phenomenological notion of "horizon."


["On the origin of Edmund Husserl’s work Experience and Judgment and the materials on which it is based." Husserl’s assistant, Ludwig Landgrebe, put this book together, with Husserl’s approval and guidance, using many texts that have since been published in their original context; beginners in phenomenology might not find this article of interest, but to me as a Husserl specialist, it is an outstanding and very helpful work of scholarship, since we can tell which words are from Husserl himself and which may be transitions written by Landgrebe. However, I think that even where he was not directly using, for example, a particular long passage from Husserl, Landgrebe was still true to Husserl’s thought; cf. my “Phenomenologist at Work,” cited in §6 below, 8 n. 11, and contrast the reference to Sawicki in §2 below.]


[Note that the English translation includes *Husserliana* 31 on active synthesis as well as *Husserliana* 11 on passive synthesis, along with selected texts from *Husserliana* 14 and 17, and the material from *Husserliana* 11 is presented in a different order than in the original. Most relevant for the cursillo is *Husserliana* 11, Division 3, on association, affection, and anticipation, along with Appendix XXV on kinaestheses.]

### Selected works toward understanding Husserl's phenomenology of the body


["Notes on space-constitution." Rich descriptions of kinaestheses, space, and sensory fields, from May 1934. The editor here spells his name “Schuetz” to reflect the original umlaut (“Schütz”), but is the same phenomenological sociologist we know as Alfred “Schutz” (the version of his name he ultimately used in the United States). Note that in his “Editor’s Preface,” he refers to Husserl’s use of “a strange German shorthand known only by Husserl himself and by very few of his closest assistants,” but the Gabelsberger shorthand system was actually much more widely known than this—it was probably "strange" to Schutz because he was from Austria, not Germany. I myself have a friend, now in her eighties, who used Gabelsberger shorthand in her first job as a secretary when she came to the United States after World War II, and she has shown me her father’s diary with entries in Gabelsberger.]


[On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the Nachlass. Second Part: 1921–1928. See, e.g., Text Nr. 25, with the examples of simply “allowing” my breath to flow on, just as I “allow” the children to play in the next room, or “allowing” my hands to play a familiar piece at the piano without having to direct every detail of the movement. Some 1924 reflections on how one might possibly experience a bodiless ghost we can neither see nor touch will be found at the beginning of Text Nr. 16.]


[On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the Nachlass. Third Part: 1929–1935. See especially 245–330 (Nr. 15, Nr. 16, Beilage XVI, Beilage XVII, Nr. 17, Beilage XVIII, Nr. 18, Beilage XIX) and 641–65 (Beilage L, Beilage LI, Nr. 37, Beilage LII, Beilage LIII, Beilage LIV, Beilage LVI.)]

### The philosopher as a person and the story of his Nachlass

[The term *Nachlass* refers to his literary estate, comprising research manuscripts not published during his lifetime.]


[This is where Husserl says he cannot live without clarity and tells us that we must “walk the paths themselves”—see 25.IX.1906 entry.]


[“Malvine Husserl’s ‘sketch of a picture of E. Husserl’s life.’” This biographical sketch was written by Husserl’s wife, Malvine, in a convent in Belgium where she took refuge in 1939 (after Husserl’s death in 1938), and Karl Schuhmann has provided an introduction along with many annotations.]


[Martina Stieler and her husband were friends of the Husserl family; these informal recollections were probably written in Autumn 1959.]


[*Edmund Husserl and the phenomenological movement. Testimony in text and image.* Includes recollections of, and articles about, Husserl, but above all a complete pictorial chronicle of Husserl’s life.]


[Cairns studied with Husserl 1924–26 and 1931–32; this volume records only one conversation from 1926, but many from 1931–32, covering a great range of topics and giving us a sense of how Husserl himself interacts with a student’s questions, carrying out phenomenological reflections, analyses, and descriptions in the here and now. With regard to the cursillo, see, e.g., the index entries for affection/affective power; body; hyle; kinaesthesia; present (living present); sensation.]


[“Archiving Husserl’s Nachlass 1933–1935. In memory of Karl Schuhmann.” Husserl was keenly aware that he had never published a systematic work that could encompass the architecture of his phenomenology as a whole (to say nothing of the thousands of pages of analysis and description of specific themes), and he deliberately organized his unpublished manuscripts in such a way as to serve as a substitute. This is the story of his efforts to organize—during the disruptions of Nazi Germany, where Husserl’s Jewish ancestry subjected him to many restrictions and dangers—over 40,000 pages (in shorthand), produced over about 35 years, in a way that reflected his deepest philosophical aims and achievements, making this material available for future researchers.]

[See especially Father Herman Leo Van Breda’s account of how he got Husserl’s Nachlass—his “literary estate,” i.e., the many thousands of manuscript pages (in shorthand) described in the preceding entry—safely out of Nazi Germany. I was privileged to meet Father Van Breda at a Husserl Circle meeting in 1973, the year before his death—a very courageous man with many stories to tell.]

Selected secondary sources


[An excellent introduction to many themes in Husserl; most relevant for the cursillo are Chapter 3, §2, on time-consciousness (more detail than the brief presentation I offered), and Chapter 4 on “Perception, Thing, and Space,” especially §3 on kinaesthetic systems, sensuous fields, and the “if-then” relation between kinaesthetic “circumstances” and the appearances or sensations they motivate.]


[Collection of essays (translated from German) focused on Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as clarifying the “ultimate” foundations of science; particularly helpful are the Introduction, Chapter I on descriptive method, and Chapter II on evidence, but chapters on intentionality, psychology, history, lifeworld, etc., are all clearly written by a woman who was one of the finest Husserlian thinkers I’ve ever met.]


[The first volume moves from the beginning of Husserl’s thought in the early mathematical works through the years teaching at Göttingen; then, on April 1, 1916, Husserl took up a position in Freiburg, and the second volumes covers work produced there. I have not yet had access to the second volume, but the first is written with deep respect for Husserl while at the same time including some critical points. Mohanty covers both the works published during Husserl’s lifetime and Nachlass material subsequently published in Husserliana. The detailed presentation nicely complements the accounts in the two works just mentioned above.]


[Useful lists, covering material through the late 1990s, of Husserl bibliographies; of Husserl’s own works and translations of them; and of secondary literature in German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch, plus an index of keywords to find works on a given theme or topic.]

§2. Questions of method

A basic distinction

Delius contrasts the attitude proper to “description,” which attempts to remain true to what is given, and the attitude proper to “understanding,” which interprets what is given in terms of something else, something that is not part of the initial field of what is given and described—usually in order to reveal a “deeper,” “hidden” or “concealed” meaning by taking what is originally given in terms of a preconceived hypothesis or interpretive framework. In other words, Delius painstakingly contrasts Husserl's pure phenomenological description and analysis, which is true to the experiential evidence, with Heidegger’s “hermeneutical” phenomenology.

The notion of “intentional analysis”

The notion of “intentional analysis” takes on different nuances in different phases of Husserl’s thought; sometimes it seems to be the title of a method, and sometimes it seems to be the title of a task to be carried out by a variety of phenomenological methods. I used the term in the cursillo because in certain contexts, “phenomenological method” has been equated with “eidetic method,” whereas what I want to emphasize is the investigation of what Husserl terms the universal a priori of correlation (6/§46), i.e., the correlation between “experiencing” and “that which is experienced.” See the sources indicated below for more on this notion.

Husserl, Edmund. Formale und transzendentale Logik (see §1 above for the full reference), §85 (especially the last two paragraphs); §§97–98; Beilage II, §2.


Ströker, Elisabeth. The Husserlian Foundations of Science (see §1 above for the full reference).

[See the Index of Topics under Analysis, intentional; see also Analysis, historical-intentional, as well as Analysis, intentional-historical, and cf. Analysis, constitutive; Analysis, constitutive-genetic; Analysis, constitutive-historical.]

Contributions from Richard Zaner


[This essay emphasizes that we cannot understand Husserlian phenomenological method merely by talking about it—we must actually perform and undergo it.]

The notion of “appropriate sensibility”


[Although Sokolowski uses the term “appropriate sensibility” in passing (see 108–109), it has become a technical term for me; for example, if we are investigating the somaesthetic field, we will need to learn to discern and discriminate among many subtle bodily feelings (e.g., a kind of “tingling” of aliveness, or a “pulsing,” or a feeling of “release,” and so on). See also §§5–6 for helpful examples contrasting the “empty” and the “filled” on the one hand (e.g., merely talking “about” something vs. perceiving it firsthand) and the “vague” and the “distinct” on the other.]

From the “things themselves” to the “phenomena themselves”


[To the points made in these articles I would add that although phenomenology has indeed often been interpreted as a return to the “things” or “matters” themselves (Sachen selbst), Husserl also speaks of the “phenomena themselves” (see, e.g., 2/60, 16/9, 6/123) and emphasizes that the “matters” dealt with in transcendental phenomenology only come into view when we shift, through the transcendental-phenomenological epochē...
Questions of textual interpretation


[This has nothing to do with “philosophical hermeneutics” as in Heidegger or Gadamer, or Ricoeur’s work with psychoanalysis, etc., but with philology and hermeneutics in the classic sense—beginning with reconstructing and correcting corrupt texts, but also exegesis, and ultimately, methodically guided critique of the pre-methodical understanding of texts. Seebohm, a noted phenomenologist who has influenced my own path, uses phenomenological methods in this work to clarify problems in hermeneutics, and also includes a key description (§12) of a basic level of “animal understanding” prior to language—cf. the question whether certain phenomenological findings (for example, concerning affection) hold good for all sentient beings.]


[The part of this complex book relevant to the cursillo is Sawicki’s documentation of Stein’s editorial work for Husserl, which shows that Stein deliberately tried to recast Husserl’s work—especially in *Ideas 2*, but also in the time lectures—to reflect her own philosophical commitments, not his (see 153–65, especially, e.g., the letter to Ingarden, 158–59, and cf. 73–89 for Sawicki’s account of the issues at stake—note that Sawicki is more sympathetic to Stein and to Husserl). Sawicki’s original research alerted me to the fact that *Ideas 2*—usually cited with regard to “Husserl’s” phenomenology of the body—is a corrupt text requiring careful interpretation and critique (cf. the Seebohm work above).]

Appropriating phenomenological methods for oneself


[This essay—originally written in 1992—discusses such notions as epochē and reduction, immanence and evidence, constitution and consciousness, and essences and open experience; it includes a bibliography of works about Husserlian phenomenological method (primarily work in English from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s).]


[Here I suggest that in addition to “static” phenomenological analysis as an “atemporal” inquiry into structural elements and interconnections and “genetic” phenomenological analysis as an investigation into origins, we may fruitfully pursue a “dynamic” phenomenology concerned with the ongoingness of experience; then I briefly apply the latter approach to such notions as “appearance,” “immanence” and “transcendence,” and “intuition” before discussing Husserl’s dynamization of the concept of “essence” in the notion of “style.”]

[This essay discusses the Husserlian phenomenological method of “critique of presuppositions” before reviewing the various senses of Husserl’s technical notion of “apperception,” then offers a critique of the presuppositions of the “psychophysical apperception” and suggests an alternative apperception of the body as a “medium” for lived movement.]

§3. Time


[Husserl’s Winter Semester 1904/05 course concluded with lectures on phenomenology of time, but the edition of this material prepared by Edith Stein in 1917 mingled manuscripts from different years and completely changed the order in which Husserl originally presented his lecture materials. Heidegger’s 1928 edition simply took over Stein’s work without mentioning her name. It was not until the Husserliana edition that the context and chronology of these materials began to be clarified.]


[Continues the clarification of the context and chronology of Husserl’s early work on time, with some helpful interpretations.]


[The Bernau manuscripts on time-consciousness (1917/18). Husserl worked on these manuscripts during two vacation visits to the Black Forest, 30.VII.17.–1.X.17. and 1.II.18.–27.IV.18. He asked Roman Ingarden to edit them, but Ingarden politely refused; Husserl then handed them over to his assistant Eugen Fink. However, the project was not realized, and the manuscripts were finally turned over to the Husserl Archives in Louvain (Leuven) in 1969. There is more emphasis here on protention (the emergence of the new “now” at the leading edge of the living present) than in the earlier work, and the initial breakthrough to a genetic phenomenology takes place in these manuscripts.]


[Extremely rich source on such themes as the living present, primal temporalization, and much more.]
Living present. The question of the mode of being of the transcendental I in Edmund Husserl, developed from the leading clue of the problem of time. This is an early and classic introduction to Husserl's notion of the "living present"; Held studied with Landgrebe, and this is his dissertation.

Bernet, Rudolf, Kern, Iso, and Marbach, Eduard. An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology (see §1 above for the full reference).

[See Chapter 3, §2, for a careful presentation of Husserl's work on the constitution of temporal objects such as a melody, on the one hand, and on passive subjective temporalization on the other, including a clear account of the difference between "retention" (the living just-past that is still a moment within the living present, along with its continuous transition into the just-just-past, etc.) and "recollection" (which reproduces a past stretch of time, ordered in terms of before and after, within the current fluid chain of interlinked living presents.)


[This classic (and rather technical) article was made possible by the publication of Husserliana 10, including its editor's clarification of the dating of various parts of the work and the inclusion of supplementary material (1893–1917). Brough painstakingly sorts out the development of Husserl's descriptions, leading to the notion of an absolute time-constituting "flow" of consciousness as a primal dimension within which the "inner" time of experiencing is itself constituted.]


[Detailed account, including methodological considerations, historical background, and numerous helpful examples; unlike the technical article cited just above, this text was written to be an introduction to the topic, concluding with remarks on three celebrated themes: the one and the many, constancy and change, and identity and difference.]

Brough, John B. "Time and the one and the many in Husserl's Bernauer Manuscripts on time consciousness." Philosophy Today 46 (SPEP Supplement 2002), 142–53.

[Brough's response to the publication of the Bernau manuscripts in Husserliana 33; includes (149ff.) a helpful summary of the various "levels" of time-constitution.]


[Carefully distinguishes various possible levels of analysis, as well as differentiating protention of the "just-coming" at various degrees of contentual specificity, including the role of our own expectations when we are already familiar with the type of phenomenon in question.]

[This essay uses an unusual example—the “protentional body practice,” which does not take the body as a transcendent thing or object, but turns to the way in which I am ongoingly “embracing” myself (e.g., “making a body” in a particular way)—then investigates the spontaneous shifts that can occur when we live-in the leading edge of this process in the living present without knowing (or projecting) “what will happen next” in this ongoing “how” of embodiment (I include both static and genetic descriptions of the possibilities at stake). The essay concludes by contrasting “integrating” consciousness with “improvisational” consciousness.]


[Absolute flow – primal process – primal temporalization. Husserl’s phenomenology of time. I do not have access to this work, but there is a copy in Morelia, and it looks like a rich survey of many aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of time.]

§4. Sensory fields


[“The Forms of Spatiality. Their Significance for Motorics and Perception.” See for comparisons of audial and visual space, and see p. 26 for the claim that the “I” descends from the head “into the trunk” while dancing; cf. also the list p. 285 of *Phenomenological Psychology* summarizing Straus’s “Phenomenological Comparisons of Color and Sound.”]


[Outstanding example of one phenomenologist taking up the claim of another phenomenologist—see the Straus reference above—and testing it against the experiential evidence; also includes (at the end) a description of the lived experience of becoming one with the music you are listening to.]

Husserl, Edmund. “<Zur haptischen Konstitution der praktischen Welt. Der Vorzug der Tastwahrnehmung vor der visuellen Wahrnehmung>” [1931]. Beilage XXX in his *Die Lebenswelt* (see §1 above for the full reference), 396–400; “<On the haptic constitution of the practical world. The priority of tactile perception over visual perception,>” draft translation by Elizabeth A. Behnke.

[The pointed brackets around the title indicate that it was chosen by the editor, not by Husserl himself—many of the texts he produced in his daily writing practice are untitled. In addition to contrasting vision and touch, this short text also includes interesting material on the moments of “location” and “strength” in practical and perceptual kinaestheses.]

[This classic work includes (115–23) important clarifications concerning the notion of intentionality in Husserl’s later work (passive synthesis, horizon intentionality, genetic constitution, anonymous intentionality, operative intentionality), but I cite it here because of an important distinction I make us of in the paper cited below, namely, that between “intentionality” and “reflexivity” (Part Three of Mohanty’s book): whereas the technical term “intentionality” refers to subjectivity’s openness to an “object” (commonly delineated by saying that consciousness is “consciousness-of …”), “reflexivity” in the sense meant here refers to an original pre-reflective self-awareness of a completely different style, where subjectivity is lucidly lived from within without becoming an “object” for itself.]


[Although this paper was originally presented at the 1984 meeting of the Merleau-Ponty Circle, I used Husserlian descriptive methods to elucidate various paradigmatic styles of perception—notably, “separative seeing,” where a “subject” faces an “object” that is over-against, other than, and at a distance from the perceive, in contrast to “lucid awareness from within,” in which we suffuse our own movement with lucid awareness, appreciating our own kinaesthetic capability “in the act” without making it into an “object.”]


[“Self-awareness and I in Husserl.” I referred to this essay in conjunction with the notion of a “lucid awareness from within” as a self-awareness that does make itself an “object.” Kern turns to traditions from India and contrasts orthodox Vedic positions such as the Nyāya school, where one can only become aware of one’s acts of cognition through a second, subsequent act making the original act an object; a position associated with the orthodox Sāmkhya school, according to which a higher, non-material “witness” consciousness can become aware of our mundane/material acts of cognition; and a third position associated with, e.g., the Yogacāra school, here expressed in the metaphor of an oil lamp that illuminates itself from within as well as shedding light on its surroundings.]


[Includes (43–49) descriptions of the kinaesthetic experience of “ground” and “gravity,” lucidly lived from within, in contrast to the structures of visual and of tactile experiencing.]


[Touching, smelling, tasting. An aesthetic of the anaesthetized senses. I do not have access to the book, but have read a number of the articles on which it is based (see, e.g., the entry above); the author’s aim is to retrieve styles of sensory experience that may often go unnoticed if we focus on visual and audial modes.]

§5. Kinaesthetic consciousness.


*[Edmund Husserl’s theory of space-constitution. Claesges studied with Landgrebe, and this is his dissertation. It is the classic source on the notion of “kinaesthetic consciousness” in Husserl, and includes many quotations from as yet unpublished D manuscripts.]*


*[Brief introduction to kinaesthetic consciousness, with some examples from dance, by my first phenomenology teacher.]*


*[See 17–18 for a review of Husserl’s notion of kinaesthetic consciousness and 19–22 for some senses of the term “kinaesthetic system” that go beyond the usual division of the body into practical and perceptual “organs.”]*

§6. Affectivity


*[These three essays were all part of a single research project, but the research report was too long to be published in the journal that invited me to contribute a paper on affectivity—thus I divided the material up into these three parts. My presentation on affectivity in the cursillo drew directly from these papers; see the notes and embedded references in these essays for specific references to Husserl and other sources, and cf. also the closing remarks below.]*


*[Includes descriptions of interkinaesthetically “opening oneself up to” or “closing oneself off,” of “going along with” or “holding back,” of “letting oneself be touched/moved” or “tightening up” and “numbing” oneself, and so on, raising the question of the kinaesthetics of trust and safety.]*

[I do not necessarily agree with every detail of Christian Lotz’s Husserl-interpretation, but several of his chapters offer a good review, from another point of view, of various issues related to a phenomenology of the body and of affectivity; see especially Chapters 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, and see also the index entries for “Affectivity” and for “Body.”]

§7. Limit cases and liminal experiences

*Whose body?*


[Raises (among many other points) the question of “whose body” we choose as the starting point for our phenomenological investigations of modes of embodiment, styles of bodily awareness, etc.]

*Difficult experiences*

[Sentient/sensitive motility in a condition of health and wholeness may be described as a fluid and appropriate dialogue between kinaesthetically attuned affectivity on the one hand and the world and others on the other hand. What happens when this relational interchange is disrupted by difficult experiences (whether our language characterizes these experiences as “emotional,” “physical,” etc.)? The research presented in the first two of my papers below draws upon the following two books by Anna Luise Kirkengen:]


[Kirkengen uses phenomenological notions and phenomenologically informed research methods to disclose various “themes” or “patterns” pertaining to abusive experiences and their aftermath; each theme is exemplified in case histories using the study participants’ own words, bringing out the structures of these difficult lived experiences and elucidating the way in which the body mutely testifies to unspeakable, socially silenced violations. She concludes by showing how mainstream medicine fails to “hear” these silenced messages and effects a “structural violation of human dignity” (391) by marginalizing persons whose symptoms resist the usual diagnoses and treatments, but can change dramatically when the person’s own story is finally heard.]


[The focus of this work may be summarized in the author’s own words: “This book deals with how people may be affected, with regard to their health, by having their personal integrity violated, that is, having their boundaries transgressed without their consent or even against their will. And it concerns the medical profession’s dealings with health problems that result from various kinds of boundary violations. The book’s main question and concern is the following: do biomedical professionals have adequate knowledge at their disposal to assist and support people whose suffering springs from integrity violation in general and from socially silenced boundary violation in particular? Boundary violations
may be enacted as sexual, physical, mental, and emotional abuse and neglect of both children and adults within families. They may also be inherent in socially legitimized or rationalized violations of groups of people or strata of populations by means of racist, sexist, or other discriminating structures that stigmatize, marginalize, and humiliate. A fundamental issue in this book is whether this kind of social reality can be accounted for in medical knowledge production so that medical practitioners can meet and support humiliated people on the basis of knowledge that represents a ‘true’ frame of reference for the impact of such existential experiences on these people’s health” (15–16).


[Emerging research in psycho-neuro-endocrino-immunology implies that “the traditional biomedical framework, grounded in a dualistic concept of mind and matter as both separate and different, has been invalidated”; what we experience and how we experience it affect our health—our integrity and vitality—at every level, “from the cellular to that of personhood” (1096). Thus it is crucial to develop new paradigms for health care by integrating the phenomenological notion of the lived body into medical research and clinical practice.]


[This paper discusses the way in which difficult experiences are sedimented in the body, including a style of “dissociative” embodiment where we do now feel our own lived bodies as we move.]


[This essay describes the kinaesthetic and temporal structures of bracing oneself to endure difficult experiences, and concludes by outlining a possible practical approach to what I term “restorative embodiment work,” comprising Retrieval from Anonymity; Possibilizing (see the entry below); Protentional Openness; and Relational Trust (forming the acronym “RAPPORT”).]


[See 177f. about the “act of possibilizing” (cf. “Enduring,” above), involving “freeing-from” the actual and “freeing-for” the possible, as a fundamental way in which to radicalize the very sense of “learning”; the notion of possibilizing also appears in Zaner’s “Examples and Possibles,” 43, and “Eidos and Science,” 9 (see §2 above for the full references).]


[This essay concludes with a question from the domain of embodied ethics: how can we bear witness to others’ stories of difficult experiences, truly being there for them and supporting them, rather than shrinking away from them and shutting them out?]
The possibility of a bodily practice of peace


[Making peace in this world, on this earth, with the cats—and others—by letting weight settle into the surface that supports you; steadying your gaze; opening your heart; and not-knowing what will happen next.]


[This is the book I referred to about a “dialogue” between the blood pressure of speakers in a conversation—also includes other examples of intercorporeal connectedness and asks (179) “What if all our bodies are part of a much larger body”—a “communal body”?

§8. Body/movement awareness practices as allies in developing an “appropriate sensibility” for the experiential evidence proper to a phenomenology of the body and of affectivity


[In this and other works Alexander contrasts the habit of “end-gaining” with the principle of turning to the “means-whereby,” i.e., becoming aware of the kinaesthetic “how” of our actions. The philosopher John Dewey wrote prefaces to several of Alexander's books and considered his approach crucial to the future of education.]


[I referred to this practice—which derives from the work of Elsa Gindler (1885–1961)—as a way of cultivating an “appropriate sensibility” for a phenomenology of the body and affectivity; cf. the example of giving a stone to another, or receiving a stone from another, with full awareness of giving and receiving weight.]


[Experiential experiments such as tapping one’s torso to allow breathing to shift of its own accord in response; this author too is working in the Gindler tradition.]


[Introduces the theory and practice of the approach developed by Gerda Alexander (no relation to F. M. Alexander), including documentation of the phenomenon of “tonus imitation”; the English edition includes (143–53) an essay by Belgian actor/pianist Michael Seifert on the use of Eutony in music and theatre.]

[This book illustrates the style of light, loose movement I invited you to try out by strumming an invisible guitar and letting your thumb and fingers move freely; such work involves both an interrogative attitude ("What could be lighter? What could be freer? What could be more optimal here?") and a willingness to "let it happen" rather than trying to "make" things happen.]


[Juhan (112) tells the story (based on observations by Milton Trager) of the old man whose body loses its stiffness under general anaesthesia—only to regain his rigidity, little by little, as he returns to consciousness; he also refers to what I have termed the "sedimentation of motility in materiality" by pointing out that "experimentation becomes gesture, gesture becomes posture, and posture becomes structure" (231), so that "my favorite fixed positions eventually cease to be something I am doing and become to a large degree what I am" (220).]


[Hanna is the existential philosopher who wound up teaching yoga at his university and inviting Moshe Feldenkrais to give his first training courses in the United States; this book introduces the notion of "sensory-motor amnesia," and describes the "Danza de los Viejitos" as a way of illustrating the myth that aging inevitably means loss of motility. (NB: when I spoke in the cursillo of his reference to this dance, I did not remember his story accurately—he actually refers specifically to Patzcuaro.)]


[Covers many figures in, and approaches to, transformative somatic practice, often in their own words through essays or interviews. Johnson studied Merleau-Ponty with Edward S. Casey and often makes connections between somatics and phenomenology. See also the German edition mentioned in the entry below.]


[Describes consciously aligning my "I-can" with what I am already doing (e.g., holding my head at a certain habitual angle) and allowing spontaneous shifts to emerge.]


[This is one of the sources I consulted in devising experiential experiments with sensing that can help attune us to the "phenomena themselves."]


[The working concept of Elsa Gindler (1885–1961) presented in the framework of pedagogical reform in physical education. “Allow something to change.” We are seeking funding for an English translation, perhaps under the title “Elsa Gindler’s Working Practice in its Historical Context.” She was working with body/movement awareness in]
Berlin while Husserl was working with kinaesthetic consciousness and affectivity in Freiburg; what if they had met??!!?]

§9. Miscellaneous works related to our discussions and questions

**Forthcoming journal issue on phenomenology of embodiment**

*Studia Phaenomenologica* 12 (2012), dossier on “Possibilities of Embodiment,” ed. Elizabeth A. Behnke and Cristian Ciocan. (For subscription information, see [www.studia-phaenomenologica.com](http://www.studia-phaenomenologica.com)).

[Opens with an essay on phenomenology without “the body,” then includes articles on Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Patočka, Nancy, Deleuze, and Arendt, and on pain; combat sports; dance; pedagogy and meditation; and ecology.]

**Philosophy**


[I referred in the cursillo to the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka (1907–1977), who had been prohibited from lecturing since 1949, but was able to present these lectures in 1968–69 during a brief period of liberalization; he was the mentor of Václav Havel (later the President of the Czech Republic) and in 1977 was one of the spokespersons for Charta 77, which lead to his death following two months of police interrogation. This text (based on student notes) is partly inspired by Husserl, partly by Heidegger, and includes Patočka’s reflections on what he calls the three existential “movements” of human life; cf. my “Phenomenologist at Work” (see §6 above for the full reference), 14f., as well as “Embodiment Work for the Victims of Violation” (see §7 above for the full reference).]


[Bartky addresses Foucault’s notion of power by discussion the lived experience of oppression, especially in the case of how women are led to apprehend their own bodies; I draw upon her work in my "The Socially Shaped Body" (see §7 above for the full reference), 241–43.]


[Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of instinct. The fine Korean phenomenologist Nam-In Lee studied with Klaus Held, and this is his dissertation; it is now the standard work on the topic, and is frequently cited. I completed an English translation a number of years ago, but questions about paying for translation rights discouraged the original publisher—we are currently re-submitting the translation to Springer.]


[This essay follows Husserl’s analyses, in *Ideas 2* and the *Crisis*, of the constitution of the “physicalistic thing” in order to show how similar processes of abstraction, homogenization, unitization, and universalization make food a mere “commodity” and take bodily persons solely as “consumers,” concluding by suggesting how a phenomenological approach can resist the commercial corporate mentality and foster a
more sustainable world. In other words, here—as with some of my other work more
directly related to a phenomenology of the body—I want to demonstrate that
phenomenology is not a merely "theoretical" enterprise: adopting a phenomenological
attitude can transform our lives in many ways.]

**Cultural history**


[Addresses the question of the historical emergence of an appreciation of kinaesthetic
experience in fields as diverse as handwriting analysis, amusement park rides, etc.]

**Theatre and Dance**

**Theatre**


[As the title indicates, this book is not solely about theatrical performance for its own
sake. However, the Prologue begins with an outstanding description of a particular
theatre work, and the other opening chapters may be helpful as well.]


[Cited in the Nuki article listed below; I haven’t seen this source, but the citations from it
seem promising.]


[Includes (335) a summary of a Husserlian approach to theatre pieces in terms of
"perceptive fiction"; emphasizes the concretion of theatre performance in living, moving
bodies.]

**Dance**


[The author’s aim is to address “familiar” or “typical” modes of “masculine” and “feminine”
comportment by turning to the "how" of the movement of male and female Flamenco
dancers.]


[I have not yet had access to this work.]

Behnke, Elizabeth A. “Contact Improvisation and the Lived World” (see §4 above for the full reference).

[Descriptions of an improvisatory dance style based on intercorporeal awareness of moving bodies in contact with one another and in dialogue with fields of balance and support, all as lived from within, in the act, in dynamic change.]


[Takes the notion of dance “technique” in a Heideggerian way as “revealing,” e.g., the possibilities of the body—or even the social normalization of the body in Foucault’s sense.]


[The order of the lived body. A dance-philosophical account. This work (which was the author’s dissertation) is not yet available to me, but was written by someone with actual dance experience.]


[The author says in passing that “Husserl’s kinaesthetic system does not dance” (110), but Husserl does mention dance in a number of texts—see, e.g., 39/369 n.1, 376, 378 n.1—and there is documentary evidence of Husserl himself actually dancing at a social occasion; in her “Memories of Edmund Husserl” (see §1 above for the full reference), Martina Stieler describes (370) getting Husserl to dance with her at a faculty party—“I actually succeeded, but I didn’t expect everyone else to stop. They formed a large circle around us, and everyone clapped and sang: ‘The Wesensschau is dancing’” (the term Wesensschau refers to “seeing,” or having insight into, essences).]

A special contribution by Sabrina Castillo

[Sabrina Castillo is a dancer, choreographer, and phenomenologist from Guatemala; we have been friends and colleagues for many years now (first via handwritten letters, later through e-mail), but have not yet met face to face. At my request, she has kindly provided the following list of some of her works that are relevant to the themes of the cursillo—I haven’t seen any of this material yet, but I look forward to reading it!]

Phenomenology/dance


**Dance/choreographic practices**


**Dance/somatics**


**Phenomenology and Asian Philosophy**


*Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*. Ed. Lester Embree et al. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997 [cf. entries under Buddhism, India, and Japan, along with the works these entries refer to].

Spileers, Steven, comp. *Edmund Husserl Bibliography* (see §1 above for the full reference) [see the index to trace works under the following categories: Buddhism, Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Yoga, Zen].

**§10. Further background on a Husserlian phenomenology of the body**


[Many writers take the second volume of Husserl’s *Ideas* to be his main work in phenomenology of the body; cf., however, the work by Sawicki mentioned in §2 above. This essay summarizes the main issues concerning the body in *Ideas 2* while keeping in mind the problems associated with Stein’s work on this text.]


[Introduces the notion of “making a body” (in analogy to “making a fist” or “making a face”) and considers the sedimented gestures that continue to haunt our individual styles of embodiment.]


[Detailed investigation of whether or not the lived body can be experienced as a “thing,” and if so, in what sense—and through what constitutive performances.]

Closing remarks

In order to introduce Husserl’s work on what I call sentient/sensitive motility to an interdisciplinary audience, I drew upon many sources and attempted to find or to invent as many experiential examples and experiments as possible, so that we would not merely be dealing with “empty” words, but would have the experiences/phenomena themselves to fulfill these words. We could have proceeded very differently, meeting to read Husserl together each day, closely and carefully studying a series of shorter texts on our themes. For example, I was not sure in advance who the participants in the cursillo would be, but if a “close reading” approach had seemed best to me, we could have turned to one or more of the following texts (and I had copies with me just in case): HM8/Nr. 66 (September 1931?); Nr. 69 (8 March 1932), Nr. 70 (9 March 1932), Nr. 71 (10 March 1932); Nr. 79 (September 1931), especially c)—or perhaps 39/Text Nr. 2 (around 1920); Beilage I and especially its continuation in Beilage XXXIX (both around 1920)—these are unusually clear, with many experiential distinctions); Text Nr. 43 (January 1931), which raises challenging philosophical issues connected with the primal beginning of affection. Or we could have studied 39/Beilage L (October–November 1931) and especially Beilage XXX (1931)—that is why I prepared the English translation of the latter mentioned in §4 above, which is also relevant to the issues addressed under §5 above. And there are many other Husserl texts relevant to our theme as well. But even if we proceeded via a close reading of specific texts, we could still turn to the relevant experience/phenomena themselves at each point!

Finally: I have no way of knowing who among you, the October 2012 cursillo participants, will find yourself on a path that includes further work in phenomenology (or in Husserlian phenomenology in particular). However, much of the information included here is meant not only to document the tradition from which I was speaking to you, but also to suggest some resources to which you can turn if the course of your own unique and evolving life makes such material relevant to you. So if I may—and as paradoxical as this may sound—I would like to welcome you to your own journey, to wish you good luck, and to remind you that the phenomenological tradition is an open generative community (one extending across generations) within which you now all already have a place, each in your own way. Thanks for your participation!

Betsy